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Abstract
This article examines some intriguing shifts in Islamic thinking on questions
around citizenship and multiculturalism that have emerged in the
Malaysian context in recent years. It does so in the light of the March
2008 election results and other recent political developments, notably the
rise of  Anwar Ibrahim’s PKR, and considers the implications for Malaysia.
Of particular focus is the novel Islam Hadhari concept articulated by
UMNO leader Prime Minister Badawi and the relatively doctrinaire
Islamic state ideas of  Islamist PAS. The article argues that these shifts in
Islamic thinking are largely propelled by politics. Partly they are propelled
by the logic, in a narrow political sense, imposed by the particular political
circumstances that confront these Muslim-based political parties in
Malaysia’s multi-ethnic, multi-religious setting. Partly the impetus is derived
from growing general concerns in Malaysia that a new and more stable
and enduring settlement of  the issues associated with the country’s notorious
horizontal divisions must be found if Malaysia is to avoid a disastrous
plunge into communal conflict or tyranny.
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Citizenship, multiculturalism and Islam, and a broad range of
associated issues interact in rather complex and unusual ways in
Malaysia. Consequently, and because of  its distinctive combination
of social and political characteristics, Malaysia has consistently drawn
considerable attention from political scientists, historians and
sociologists. For the same reasons Malaysia is at the forefront of  the
current “global ijtihad” where many pressing contemporary problems
confronting Muslim thinkers, policy makers and populations are being
worked through. In particular Malaysia is highly relevant to the problems
of  pluralism and the politics of  identity. Recently there have been
some significant political developments in Malaysia, accompanied by
some intriguing shifts in Islamic thinking on problems associated with
citizenship and multiculturalism. This paper will survey these shifts in
Islamic thinking in the Malaysian context, analyse the politics propelling
them and consider the implications for Malaysia’s future.
Malaysia is well known for its complex horizontal divisions. The
key features of  Malaysia’s complex ethnic and religious composition
can be gleaned from the following statistics. According to the 2000
census Muslims comprise 60.4% of the population, Christians 9.1%,
Hindus 6.3%, Buddhists 19.2%, Confucian and Taoist 2.6%.1
Furthermore, 65.1% of  the population are bumiputra (indigenous), with
Chinese and Indians comprising 26% and 7.7% of the population
respectively.2 Each of  these somewhat crude categories contains a
number of  self-identifying ethno-linguistic groups. Most politically
significant in this regard is the composition of  the bumiputra category.
We know that overwhelmingly the bumiputra are Malay and Muslim,
but there is some difficulty ascertaining the precise proportions. In a
2004 speech Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi stated that 54% of
Malaysia’s population is Malay, but other sources give a lower figure,
–––––––––––––––––
1 Census of Population and Housing Malaysia 2000, Department of Statistics
Malaysia.
2 Bumiputra literally means “sons of the soil”.
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only slightly above 50%.3 Since by definition Malays are Muslims, most
of the bumiputra are Muslims, but there is a significant bumiputra
Christian minority, mainly Iban and Kadazan from Malaysian Borneo.
Approximately half  of  Malaysia’s Christians are bumiputra. A number
of important political implications flow from this complex pattern of
horizontal identities. But the central defining political driver is that
while the Malays are a majority, they are not a comfortable majority.
The same applies to Malaysia’s Muslims, although to a lesser extent
since the size of the Muslim majority is significantly greater than that
of  the Malays.
B. The Notoriety and Drama of the Malaysian Case
The notoriety of the Malaysian case can be attributed to the
unique and often seemingly contradictory association of several
features. First, Malaysia is ostensibly a secular state with freedom of
religion enshrined in the Constitution (Article 11). Secondly, Islam is
the official religion (Article 3), a status which, supported by numerous
legal and other measures, notably Article 21 1A has effectively come
to confer a privileged position upon Islam above other religions extant
in Malaysia. Thirdly, religion and ethnicity are closely correlated in
Malaysia, not only in the imagined community sense, but also legally
with respect to the Malays who are defined by the constitution as people
who are Muslim, speak the Malay language and follow Malay customs.
There are Christians amongst the Indian, Chinese, and, as mentioned,
amongst some of  the indigenous communities. But Indians are
–––––––––––––––––
3 For instance the CIA World Factbook (http://www.cia.gov/library/
publocations/theworld-factbook/print/my.html), accessed 19/12/2008, gives the Malay
proportion of the population (as of 2006) as 50.4% and other indigenous as 11%. A
possible reason for the discrepancy might be that Badawi has included Muslim indigenes
of  Borneo in the Malay category, a practice not without precedent but one that Borneans
usually resent. The Malay category is certainly slippery. Many Malaysians with Indian,
Arab or Chinese ancestry self-identify as Malay on the grounds that one parent is Malay,
and are legally recognised as such, provided they are also Muslim. The Malay category
also contains people who in another context might be identified or self identify as
Acehnese, Minangkabau or Javanese.
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predominantly associated with Hinduism, although there is a significant
number of Indian Muslims, and the Chinese are mainly associated with
Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. And lastly, not only are religious
and ethnic differences politicised in Malaysia but the Malaysia political
system does so overtly. Malaysia’s political system is openly founded
on the assumption, organized incorporation and channelling of
communal politics.4 No doubt that Islam is such a central factor adds
considerable contemporary interest to the Malaysian case. But one
suspects that the degree of interest, both scholarly and more general,
is also due to the inherent drama of the Malaysian situation.
Malaysia is a prosperous nation, a developing country that is
nearing developed status. Malaysia is also stable and peaceful. It is not
a country torn apart by racial and religious conflict. Nor is Malaysia a
country where its populace is the subject of  a ruthless tyranny, like
Burma or North Korea. Hence Malaysia’s somewhat optimistic
description by one scholar as a “unique model of tolerance and
accommodation”.5 And yet Malaysia’s prosperity and peace rests upon
the fragile stability of  a compromise formula that seems impossible to
sustain over the longer term. The formula seems inherently fragile
because it involves a highly volatile mix of  ethnicity, religion and
politics. Thus there is a widespread view that sooner or later Malaysia’s
current prosperity and relative peace could give way abruptly to a
nightmare of  communal strife and/or heavy-handed authoritarian rule.
That is unless Malaysia can develop and successfully implement a more
stable and enduring settlement of the issues associated with its
horizontal divisions.6 The drama resides in the suspense of  waiting for
–––––––––––––––––
4 This is termed a form of “authoritarian consociationalism” by Graham K.
Brown, “The Formation and Management of Political Identities: Indonesia and Malaysia
Compared”, Working Paper 10, February 2005, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human
Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of  Oxford.
5 P.G. Riddell, “Malaysian Christians and Islamisation”, in A. O’Mahony & M.
Kirwan (eds.), World Christianity: Politics, Theology, Dialogues, (London: Melisende, 2004),
pp.226-256; cited in Albert Sundararaj Walters, “Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations:
A Malaysian Christian Perspective”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18, 1, ( January
2007), p. 67.
6 In passing I note that Malaysia is also riven by centre-periphery and hierarchical
divisions, but the horizontal are more significant.
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the situation to unfold, in the high stakes for Malaysia’s population,
and in the height of the fall from a position of considerable current
grace should the compromise fail and large scale communal conflict or
tyranny result.
Arguably, the likelihood of  the compromise formula’s eventual
demise has not been reduced, but rather increased by its surprising
longevity to date – it is now more than half a century old. Those
sceptical of its capacity to endure for much longer the strains to which
it is subject note that its longevity has rested upon three contingent
and tenuous factors. The nation’s prosperity has naturally worked to
alleviate discontent and given many Malaysians tangible and
considerable stakes in the status quo. Also, a complex of  mutual fears
has worked to discourage the discontented elements from upsetting
the delicately balanced status quo. The fears are those felt by members
of  each community towards their communal others. But they are also
the fears of the general costs to all of a communal conflagration, the
fears of  losing Malaysia’s prosperity and peace and all the benefits that
these bring. The final factor is the capacity and willingness of  the state
to preserve the status quo and to prevent outbreaks of  communal
violence. Fear of  the state, in particular fear of  its use of  the notorious
Internal Security Act’s indefinite detention powers, is highly pertinent
here. The sceptics also note that many Malaysians are dissatisfied with
the compromise, and apparently are becoming increasingly so, adding
to the pressures upon it.
One of the dimensions of discontent with the current
arrangements is theological for a significant number of Malaysian
Muslims. Indeed the compromise formula seems highly problematic
from an Islam perspective, even allowing for the many and diverse
understandings of Islam. The growing Islamic dissatisfaction with the
peculiar Malaysian compromise is certainly a possible threat to peace
in Malaysia. But it is also potentially the source of a more stable
settlement. This will be my primary focus below, but first it would be
useful to briefly survey the historical background.
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C. Origins and Nature of  the Compromise Formula
During the century of  colonial rule before independence on 31
August 1957 Malaysia’s non-Malay population rose considerably.7 This
was largely due to British policies which encouraged immigrant Chinese
and Indian labour. By the 1930s Chinese comprised 39% of  the
population and Malays a mere 44.7% of  then British Malaya.8 Fearful
that Malays were becoming a disadvantaged minority in their own land,
a “Malay rights” movement emerged in the early C20th. It appealed to
the British authorities to implement measures to safeguard Malay
interests vis-à-vis the generally economically and educationally
advantaged Chinese and Indians. A similar stance was adopted by the
Malay political leadership when negotiating arrangements for
independence after WWII.
In 1946, galvanised by the imminent prospect of a British-
designed independence in which democracy would feature, 41 Malay
organisations came together to form the United Malay National
Organisation (UMNO). This move prompted the reciprocal formation
of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian
Congress (MIC). These organisations dealt with each other and with
the British as the principal representatives of their respective
communities. Moreover the British authorities accepted these
representational claims. As such UMNO, the MCA and MIC lobbied
and manoeuvred for the form of  independence that would best advance
their respective communities’ interests qua communities. Malaysia
appeared to be emerging as a classic case whereby democracy would
accentuate communalism by politicising and hardening communal
identities as politicians pursued and shepherded vote banks.
The leaders of these organisations were not oblivious to the
serious dangers inherent in this situation, however. Nor did they fail to
recognise their common interest in preserving the peace. Their solution
–––––––––––––––––
7 Technically this is the date of  Malaya’s independence. Malaysia was created on
16 September 1963. It consisted of Malaya (now Peninsular Malaysia), Sabah and Sarawak
(Malaysian Borneo) and Singapore. In 1965 Singapore was expelled from the Federation.
8 William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti
Malaya, 1974), p. 208.
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though was not to step back from the communal form of  political
organisation that they had adopted. On the contrary, far from
abandoning ethnicity-based politics they decided to manage it by
forming an alliance founded on a set of  communal compromise
arrangements. This alliance formula has proven to be a highly effective
political vehicle. In one form or another, the UMNO-dominated
alliance, the National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN) has won every
election since 1957. Each party draws votes from the ethnic community
it purports to represent by appealing to its interests, but the votes for
all three parties are pooled for the agreed alliance candidate. It is difficult
to compete against this formula. Other community based parties can
adopt a stronger pro-community line but they are easy to paint as
dangerous extremists and can only attract the votes of  one community.
Parties can be formed on a non-ethnic basis, but, until recently at least,
they have attracted few votes. A rival multi-ethnic coalition can be
formed, but if  so it merely confirms the formula.
As mentioned a set of communal compromise arrangements,
often referred to as a “social contract”, underpinned the successful
alliance formula. It was clearly understood that the alliance would be
dominated by UMNO with UMNO’s leader becoming prime minister,
thus ensuring Malay interests pre-eminence. In exchange the MIC and
MCA got a voice in government. And everybody got communal peace.
The eventual formula for independence reflected the spirit of  this
“gentlemen’s agreement”. Citizenship was granted fairly readily to non-
Malays and freedom of religion was constitutionally guaranteed. In
exchange the principle of special privileges for Malay citizens was
enshrined. Moreover, the Head of State position was to rotate between
the Malay sultans, Malay became the national language,9 and Islam
was made the official state religion.
D. Problems with the Malaysian “Social Contract”
The “social contract” features a set of defensive measures
designed to safeguard Malay interests. As well as Malay political
–––––––––––––––––
9 English and Malay were to be joint official languages for 10 years after which
Malay would be the sole official language.
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dominance and pro Malay symbolic measures, a range of positive
discrimination measures were also introduced. These were intended
ostensibly to assist the Malay population (then overwhelmingly rural
and poor) to catch up to the educational and economic levels of the
other ethnic groups, principally to the Chinese. The usually unstated
objective was to placate Malay public opinion and undercut the
considerable impetus for more radical Malay chauvinistic demands
(such as much more stringent citizenship tests for non-Malays). The
measures were intensified after 1969 when an outbreak of racial riots
was interpreted as indicating the dangerous persistence and depth of
Malay resentment towards the other ethnic groups. The New Economic
Policy (NEP) as it was called involved a range of  profound positive
discrimination measures, couched as “nation building”. Officially the
NEP policies were aimed at eradicating poverty altogether and erasing
all links between ethnicity and economic role or position. Perhaps a
little cynically, the stated policy aims are generally regarded as having
merely provided an acceptable face for an upsurge of Malay chauvinism
and for a re-casting of  the independence bargain in terms more
favourable to the Malays. The policies have certainly largely failed to
achieve their stated aims, despite being extended well beyond their
original term of  twenty years. What they have done, unfortunately, is
cement ethnic divisions and exacerbate ethnic tensions.
Both in 1957 and 1971 the affirmative action measures were
considered a temporary necessity by many, particularly by Malaysia’s
non Malay citizens. Overwhelmingly, non Malays have always desired
a Malaysia where all citizens are treated equally by the state irrespec-
tive of  their ethnicity or religious beliefs. As the decades passed, and
as the pro-Malay discrimination increased rather than reduced, the levels
of  non-Malay disgruntlement have risen. It became harder to believe
that the measures were merely temporary. Similarly it became harder
for non Malays to accept what they felt was second-class citizenship
when they were born in Malaysia, and when increasingly their parents
and grandparents, even great grandparents, were also.
Absurdities associated with the conflation of Malay with Islam
exacerbated the resentment. Since Malay equated with Islam, it meant
that all Muslims, including new converts and those of Arabic, Indian
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or Chinese background, could, under particular circumstances, qualify
as Malay and therefore become eligible for special provisions (including
highly profitable business advantages). Many other citizens deemed
Malay were immigrants from Indonesia or the Philippines, sometimes
including recent illegal arrivals, as well as many more whose family’s
presence in Malaysia could only be traced back one or two generations.
E. Islamisation and the Escalation of  non-Malay Concerns
Non-Malay concerns increased with a demographic shift whereby
the proportions of Muslims and Malays in the population appear to
have risen significantly since independence.10 This shift might have
been expected to alleviate Malay concerns and correspondingly reduced
their attachment to the positive discrimination measures and to
communal politics. But on the contrary (although actually there may
be no causative correlation), as the Malay and Muslim proportions of
the population have risen, Malay political dominance has been exerted
to an even greater extent. This has resulted in a number of government
policies which have escalated discontent and concerns on the part of
other communities.
This tendency has gone hand-in-hand with an Islamisation
phenomenon, sometimes referred to as an Islamic resurgence, dating
particularly from the 1980s. It is of  course not unique to Malaysia. A
number of important dakwah (missionary)-oriented organisations
emerged in Malaysia in the 1970s, particularly amongst young urban
educated Malays, a social group which has dramatically increased since
independence. Particularly prominent is Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia
(ABIM or Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement), from whose ranks
sprang former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, now leader of
the opposition and prime ministerial aspirant. Also well-known in this
regard is Darul Arqam, although it was banned for heresy in 1994,11
–––––––––––––––––
10 Albert Sundararaj Walters, “Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations: A Malaysian
Christian Perspective”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18, 1 ( January 2007), p. 68.
11 See Ahmad Fauzi and Abdul Hamid, “Inter-Movement Tension among
Resurgent Muslims in Malaysia: Response to the State Clampdown on Darul Arqam in
1994”, Asian Studies Review, 27, 3, (September 2003).
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and the once semi-clandestine Islamic Representative Council (IRC),
now Jamaah Islam Malaysia (JIM or Society for Islamic Reform
Malaysia). These groups have had a profound effect on the Islamic
discourse in Malaysia and have contributed to considerably raised levels
of  self-conscious Islamic practice and identity for Malaysian Muslims.
These factors have of  course not failed to influence Malaysian politics.
The two principal political parties supported by Malays, since
before independence, are UMNO and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-
Malaysia Islamic Party, better known as PAS). PAS has always stood
for an Islamic State, although it has not always emphasised this policy,
and until recently had made little effort to spell out what this would
entail for Malaysia.12 UMNO has generally stood against the Islamic
state concept, although Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad somewhat
ingenuously (but controversially) declared in 2001 that Malaysia was
already an Islamic state. As competitors for the Malay vote, UMNO
and PAS have engaged in periodic “bidding wars”. For the first decades
after independence the “bidding” was largely on the basis of which
party best promoted Malay communal interests, but since the 1980s it
has increasingly been couched in terms of  an Islamic agenda for
Malaysia. Partly this reflected a new ulama-based PAS leadership in
1983 which placed the ultimate objective of an Islamic state in Malaysia
more to the fore. But the general Islamisation phenomenon alluded to
above is the root cause. UMNO’s successful strategy has always been
to appropriate and modify PAS policies which appeared to be gaining
traction. Thus PAS has always “outbid” UMNO, but UMNO has
astutely judged how far it has needed to move in PAS’s Malay chauvinist
or Islamist direction in order to retain sufficient moderate Malay
support. Indeed usually UMNO has retained a narrow majority of Malay
votes. Of  course UMNO can also rely on its alliance partners to deliver
substantial votes for UMNO candidates, an advantage that PAS cannot
emulate since members of the other communities can rarely be
persuaded to vote for PAS candidates.
–––––––––––––––––
12 PAS produced an official Islamic State document in November 2003. See Erica
Miller, “Democratic Islamists? A Case Study on the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)”,
MA thesis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2006, pp. 41-2.
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Malaysia’s non-Malay communities are certainly unhappy about
the increased pro-Malay ethnic redistributionism policies begun in the
1970s. But certain “Islamisation” measures begun in the 1980s whereby
Malaysia’s Islamic identity has been emphasised and Islam become
steadily more privileged over the other religions has generated far greater
levels of  disquiet. From the perspective of  Malaysia’s non-Muslims
they have increasingly encountered a range of discriminatory practices
in the religious sphere and have become increasingly concerned that
their civil liberties are under threat. It has been suggested that effectively
many of the measures implemented in Malaysia amount to a de facto
application of “traditional dhimmi (non Muslim minority) status” for
non Muslims.13 Amongst the grievances commonly aired are claims of
grossly disproportionate allocations of  land for religious purposes.14
Christians have also complained of restrictions placed on Christian
literature, such as on the use of the Malay and Iban bibles, while free
range is given to Islamic literature, including the free dissemination of
anti Christian polemical works.15
The greatest angst for non-Muslims has arisen from an amendment
to a key section of the constitution in 1988. Article 121 (1A) provides
that civil courts “shall have no jurisdiction in respect to any matter
within the jurisdiction of the Sharia courts”.16 Effectively this has
created a jurisdictional dualism in Malaysia’s legal system, and has
overturned the previous constitutional situation whereby civil law had
clear primacy. Many Malaysians, particularly non Muslims, regard this
step as the thin end of the wedge whereby a quasi-theocratic state is
slowly evolving within the framework of the secular Malaysian state.
Encouraging this perception has been the way this article has been
interpreted and implemented. It has led to a number of high profile
cases related to apostasy and conversion where individuals dissatisfied
–––––––––––––––––
13 S. Mark Heim, “A Different Kind of  Islamic State: Malaysian Model”, The
Christian Century, 121, 20 (October 5, 2004), p. 31.
14 Albert S.Walters, “Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations”, pp. 72.
15 Ibid., pp.74-75.
16 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the
Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia”, International
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 13, (2006), p. 111.
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with increasingly assertive Sharia-court rulings now have no legal
redress.17 Non Muslims, and some Muslims, see this as being in
fundamental contradiction with Article 11 which guarantees freedom
of  religion for all citizens.
Furthermore, some Muslims have advanced arguments which
seek to alter the standard interpretation of the constitutional provision
relating to Islam as the official religion of  the Federation (Article 3.1).
It has been interpreted in some quarters to justify a dominant position
for Islam vis-à-vis other religions in law. Again this is an interpretation
which seems quite at odds with the strong constitutional provisions
guaranteeing freedom of religion and which, at least in the minds of
the nation’s founders, established Malaysia as a secular state. Tunku
Abdul Rahman, the father of Malaysia and first prime minister,
explicitly denied that Malaysia is an Islamic state. “I would like to
make it clear that this country is not an Islamic State as it is generally
understood, we merely provide that Islam shall be the official religion
of  the state.18 The behaviour of  PAS-controlled governments in states
such as Terengganu and Kelantan, where certain Sharia laws (according
to the PAS interpretation of  Sharia) have been implemented or mooted,
is also pertinent here.19 PAS administrations have implemented laws
prohibiting gambling and alcohol and imposed segregation of the sexes
and dress codes. PAS has also enacted a Hudud criminal offences bills
in 2002 in Terengganu and Kelantan and has made contradictory
remarks about its application to non-Muslims. Although sometimes
PAS has given assurances that these laws will only apply to Muslims,
on more than one occasion PAS spokesmen have explicitly stated that
eventually they will apply to non-Muslims.20 At present these Hudud
–––––––––––––––––
17 Albert S. Walters, “Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations”, pp. 76-77.
18 Federal Legislative Council Debates, 1 May 1958, pp. 4671-2, quoted in Joseph
M. Fernando, “The Position of  Islam in the Constitution of  Malaysia”, Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, 37, 2, (June 2006), pp. 249-266.
19 Erica Miller, “Democratic Islamists?”, pp. 46-54.
20 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the
Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia”, International
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 13, (2006), p. 105. Erica Miller, “Democratic
Islamists?”, pp. 48.
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law measures have been blocked by federal authorities (as PAS knew
they would be), so it remains to be seen what PAS would do in practice.
F. Growing Concerns for Malaysia’s Future
It is not only non-Muslims who are unhappy with the
“Islamisation” measures. Many Muslims, particularly urban, middle class
and younger Muslims object to some or all of  these policies. Similarly
it is not only non-Malays who find the pro-Malay positive discrimination
measures objectionable. Increasing numbers of Malays are moving to
the view that such measures at least need to be wound back. There are
a number of reasons for this phenomenon, but the over-arching
explanation is a growing concern across all horizontal identities for
Malaysia’s future if  the current trajectory were to continue. There is a
growing feeling that the original set of arrangements has been distorted
to the point where the original communal bargain has been broken, or
at least it is now superseded. Consequently Malaysia’s social fabric,
democracy, and economy are all under threat and a new course is
needed.
Amongst other things, these critics note the significant economic
cost to Malaysia of the policies that have prevailed over the last few
decades. There is a significant “brain drain” of  talented non-Malays
who feel their prospects are better overseas and there is a significant
cost in terms of  market inefficiencies associated with the positive
discrimination policies. The economic costs spiralled dramatically as
these policies moved far beyond spheres such as education into the
realm of  multi-million dollar development contracts. Apart from the
economic costs, there have also been considerable political and social
costs associated with this phenomenon due to nepotism and political
corruption.21
But most glaring is that more than half a century on from
independence the ethnic and religious landscape of Malaysia not only
remains highly politicised, but social tensions have risen sharply rather
than dissipated. Religious and ethnic divisions in Malaysia are more
–––––––––––––––––
21 Edmund Terence Gomez, “The Perils of  Pro-Malay Policies”, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 168, 8, (September 2005).
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sharply delineated than they were several decades ago. There is less
inter-ethnic and inter-religious mixing and even less apparently does a
sense of belonging to Malaysia (Malaysian nationalism and/or Malaysian
citizenship) predominate over ethnic and/or religious group
membership. Walters cites a 2000 survey carried out Universiti
Malaysia which indicated that 98% of Malay students did not mix
with non Malays, with similar results for Chinese and Indians’ mixing.22
Other surveys reveal starkly different views corresponding to Malay
versus non Malay on particular public issues.23 It was not supposed to
be this way. The positive discrimination measures were supposed to
alleviate Malay resentment and pave the way for harmony. Ominously,
disquiet over these trends has recently begun to produce a more strident
response from non-Muslims and non-Malays, who for the most part
have remained stoic since the 1960s.24
G. Recent Developments and Shifts in Islamic Thinking
The most obvious recent development which is pertinent here is
the general election held in March 2008. The UMNO-dominated BN
retained power but for the first time in Malaysia’s history was pushed
very close by the opposition alliance (Barisan Alternative or BA). The
BA comprises the DAP (Democratic Action Party), PAS and Anwar
Ibrahim’s People’s Justice Party (PKR) which campaigned strongly on
equality of  opportunity for everybody. The opposition won just under
half of the popular vote, an impressive achievement given the huge
advantage of  incumbency that accrues to the government in the
Malaysian context.25 Although this high vote for the BA only trans-
–––––––––––––––––
22 Albert Sundararaj Walters, “Issues in Christian-Muslim Relations: A Malaysian
Christian Perspective”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 18, 1, (January 2007), p. 72.
23 Carolyn Hong, “Growing Unease over race debate”, Straits Times 21/11/08.
24 Danny Lim “Rallying for Rights in Malaysia”. Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 2007. Simon Montlake, “Race Politics Hobbles Malaysia”, Far Eastern Economic
Review, March 2008, Vol.171. No.2. Jan Stark, “Indian Muslims in Malaysia: Images of
Shifting Identities in the Multi-ethnic State”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 26, 3,
(December 2006), p. 392.
25 There are many claims of electoral abuse practiced by the government in
Malaysia. For a discussion of  some of  these see Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Malaysia: Turnover
Without Change”, Journal of  Democracy, 18, 1 (2007), pp. 113-127.
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lated into 88 of 222 seats in the federal parliament and control over
five out of 13 states, it did mean that for the first time the government
lost the two thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. Inter-
estingly, Malay votes divided almost equally between BN and BA but
young and urban Malays voted overwhelmingly for the opposition re-
gardless of the ethnicity of the opposition candidate.26 Thus the elec-
tion does perhaps presage a major turning point for Malaysia in the
sphere of horizontal divisions and reflects a significant shift in public
attitudes and thinking.
Ironically Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, renowned as a
champion of Malay interests and the principal architect of the
“Islamisation” shift, himself  perhaps began the shift in thinking. In
February 1991 while launching his Vision 2020 (whereby Malaysia is
to become a fully developed country by 2020); he stated that there
was a need to develop a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nationality). It
was only talk at the time, and his policies, perhaps unintendedly to a
degree, actually pushed hard in the opposite direction. But this was a
radical concept for both historical and linguistic reasons. The term is
strikingly similar to Lee Kuan Yew’s 1964 campaign slogan which called
for “a Malaysian Malaysia” (as opposed by implication to a Malay
Malaysia which is how the social contract appeared to non-Malays).
The controversy engendered by this campaign led directly to Singa-
pore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965. The historical allusion em-
phasised that this represented a call for a sharp shift in thinking. But
perhaps the most significant (and positive) aspect of the language
employed by Mahathir is that the term bangsa had previously almost
always been utilised with chauvinistic overtones, most commonly with
respect to calls to defend the Bangsa Melayu (Malay People). Bangsa is
–––––––––––––––––
26 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Islamist Realignments and the Rebranding of
the Muslim Youth Movement in Malaysia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, 2 (2008),
p. 233.
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one of  those slippery terms that can mean people, race or nationality.27
Clearly realization of the concept of a Bangsa Malaysia would imply
abandonment of, or at least a drastically reduced adherence to, no-
tions of  separate ethnic identities.
The shift in thinking on the issues of horizontal division has a
prominent Islamic dimension. In fact there has always been a view
held by some Malaysian Muslims that Malay privileges and Malay chau-
vinism are incompatible with Islamic teachings which oppose discrimi-
nation based on ethnicity. Until more recently however it was a view
largely confined to the issue of ethnic divisions amongst Malaysian
Muslims.
This is a longstanding issue with respect to those Malaysian
Muslims whose ethnicity places them in the Indian category, or who
have Indian and Malay ancestry. The former are often still derogatorily
termed “mamak’,28 a Tamil word for uncle, whereas the latter used to
be termed Jawi Peranakan, a term which denoted Muslims who were
descended from South Indian backgrounds through the male line and
Malay through the female line. During the 1930s the more extreme
exponents of a Malay chauvinist stance defined a Malay as “a man
whose male parent is a native of this Malay Peninsula or of any of the
neighbouring islands of the Malay Archipelago”.29 This definition ef-
fectively excluded Jawi Peranakan but included Indonesians; a clear
indication that ethnicity rather than religion was the primary criterion
of  Malay identity for these Malay chauvinists. To some extent this
attitude still lingers.30 Many Malaysian Muslims with Indian heritage
–––––––––––––––––
27 Heng Pek Koon “Chinese responses to Malay hegemony (1957-1996), in
Zawawi Ibrahim (ed.), Cultural Contestations: Mediating Identity in a Changing Malaysian
Society, (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 1998), pp. 51-82, cited in Graham K. Brown,
“The Formation and Management of Political Identities: Indonesia and Malaysia
Compared”, Working Paper 10, February 2005, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human
Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, Queen Elizabeth House, University of  Oxford, p. 23.
28 Jan Stark, “Indian Muslims in Malaysia: Images of Shifting Identities in the
Multi-ethnic State”, Journal of  Muslim Minority Affairs, 26, 3, (December 2006), p. 384.
29 Quoted in William, R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, (Kuala Lumpur:
Universiti Malaya, 1974), p. 245.
30 Interestingly, Malays of  Arab descent are far less likely to experience this problem.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008 M/1429 H 341
Citizenship,  Multiculturalism, and Islam in Malaysia
are now accepted as Malay as testified by two high profile examples:
Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir Mohamed. But many others are not ac-
cepted as Malay and thus are denied the coveted bumiputra status.31
Other Indian Muslims are strongly disinclined to seek acceptance as
Malays, proudly retaining their Indian Muslim identity. Those in the
latter categories, who are also excluded from political representation
through the Hindu Tamil-dominated MIC, have recently become more
vociferous about their plight. In so doing they highlight this uncom-
fortable issue of the ethnicity-religious identity nexus for Muslims in
Malaysia.
The first significant shift in thinking on the issue of ethnic privi-
leges beyond the Muslim community came from what many would
have regarded as an unlikely source. In May 1983 new PAS president,
Yusof  Rawa, shifted PAS dramatically away from its erstwhile Malay
chauvinist stance and condemned NEP-associated policies as assabiyah
(tribalism).32 Few non-Malays welcomed this new PAS stance with much
enthusiasm however since it was accompanied by a much more avow-
edly Islamist position. Since then although never abandoning its Is-
lamist standpoint, PAS has grappled within its Islamist framework,
with the issue of  Malaysia’s substantial religious minorities and has at
times made serious efforts to reach out beyond its Muslim constitu-
ency. No doubt the endeavour has been pursued sincerely for the most
part, but there is considerable suspicion that PAS’s overtures have been
driven by opportunistic motives. Certainly PAS is acutely aware of  its
political dilemma. Unless it can attract substantial non-Muslim votes,
to win power democratically (and PAS are democratic Islamists) PAS
would need to garner almost every Muslim vote. Even if it could ac-
complish this unlikely prospect in competition with UMNO and oth-
ers it would still be confronted by the Malaysian reality of a substan-
tial non-Muslim minority.
–––––––––––––––––
31 Jan Stark, “Indian Muslims in Malaysia: Images of Shifting Identities in the
Multi-ethnic State”, Journal of  Muslim Minority Affairs, 26, 3, (December 2006), p. 384.
32 Liow, Joseph Chinyong Liow and Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, “Political Islam in
Southeast Asia: One Ummah, Many Narratives”, Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 9,2, (Spring
2008); p. 560 and Erica Miller, “Democratic Islamists?”, p. 28.
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The only other democratic path to power for PAS is through a
coalition, a strategy it has pursued with shifting degrees of  enthusiasm
all of its political life. But here too this entails establishing a modus
vivendi with non Muslim political forces. PAS has certainly made con-
siderable efforts in recent years to woo non Muslim voters and to make
it an attractive alliance partner through issuing re-assurances about its
intentions. It has campaigned with the slogan “PAS for all” and in the
recent elections even ran a young female Hindu candidate in an UMNO
stronghold (one it couldn’t win) using its non-Muslim PAS supporters
club.33 Such efforts are not particularly convincing however while PAS
pursues its Islamist agenda in places like Terengganu, but they have
produced significant electoral gains for PAS, notably in 1999 and 2008.
But moves in this direction always seem to elicit a counter reaction
within PAS which undermines the gains. Clearly there is a tug of  war
taking place within PAS between what have been termed the pragma-
tists and the purists.34 The publication in 2003 of  PAS’s Islamic state
document authored by the “purists” was partly responsible for PAS
losing all its gains in the 2004 elections. The same process seems to be
underway again as a purge of the so-called “Erdogans” (referring to
Turkey’s liberal Muslim president) who are considered pro-Anwar
Ibrahim has begun, a development which does not bode well for the
opposition alliance.35
The primary factor driving the re-examination of these issues
and the resultant modest moderation of  PAS’s Islamist position is the
inescapable reality of  Malaysia’s religious and ethnic composition. As
PAS Deputy President Nasharuddin Mat Isa stated in 2006: we have
to be realistic … [Malaysia] is not an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority
country ….we have to make the party more relevant to multi ethnic
–––––––––––––––––
33 Abdul Halim Taib, “Malaysia PAS Fields Non-Muslim Candidate”,
www.islamonline.net, accessed 29/11/2008.
34 William F. Case and Liew Chin-Tong, “How Committed is PAS to Democracy
and How Do We Know It?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 28, 3 (2006) pp. 385-406.
35 Zubaidah Abu Bakar, “Pas Begins to Axe ‘Erdogan’ Faction”, New Straits
Times, 24/11/2008.
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multi cultural and multi religious Malaysia”.36 The other crucial factor
in this regard of  course is Malaysia’s democratic political system. While
far from perfect, indeed famously classified as a quasi-democracy by
Huntington, Malaysian democracy imposes a particular political logic
which encourages moderation and compromise. It is this which also
has assisted in pushing the rather strange bedfellows of  PAS and PKR
into alliance. Ironically, it is also the restrictions on democracy that
operate in “soft authoritarian”37 Malaysia which have made these two
forces see eye to eye more than perhaps they otherwise might. To a
considerable extent their politics have been shaped by the anti demo-
cratic measures which have been employed against them by the gov-
ernment over the years. While some observers are cynical about the
degree of  PAS’s commitment to democracy,38 it is undeniable that PAS
has been remarkably consistent and more than a little courageous in
its campaigns for transparency in government and for democracy, not
least with respect to its opposition to the ISA.
In keeping with its urban, multi-ethnic, more educated and
cosmopolitan constituency, PKR’s position on Malaysia’s ethnic and
religious issues is far more liberal than that of  PAS. Anwar Ibrahim’s
campaign for democracy, civil liberties, civil society and good
governance since 1998 is well known beyond Malaysia. But within
Malaysia his stance on the former issues is perhaps even better known.
His call for narrowing “the economic divide regardless of ethnic lines”
is a politically courageous stance in the Malaysian context.39 Certainly
he is a prominent advocate of the compatibility between Islam and
liberal democracy, but beyond that his theological views are a little
harder to pin down. He began his political career as an avowed Islamist,
emerging as leader of  ABIM and regarded as somewhat close to PAS.
–––––––––––––––––
36 Quoted in William F. Case and Liew Chin-Tong, “How Committed is PAS”,
p. 397.
37 Gordon P. Means, “Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore”, Journal
of  Democracy, 7 (October 1996), pp. 103-17.
38 See William F. Case and Liew Chin-Tong, “How Committed is PAS”, pp. 385-
406.
39 Anwar Ibrahim, “Radical Islam in Southeast Asia”,  Far Eastern Economic
Review, (November 2006), p. 39.
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It is from this position that he was plucked by Mahathir Mohamed into
UMNO and government, moving accordingly to a more centrist,
moderate Islamist position. He has a reputation as a progressive
Muslim, but it is unclear to what extent this description is theologically
as opposed to politically accurate. Perhaps he is not inclined to spell
his thinking out on these issues too clearly given his need to balance
an unwieldy coalition which includes committed opponents of liberal
Islam like PAS.
The most interesting development in Islamic thinking in the
Malaysian context on these questions is that promoted since 2003 by
current Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Badawi, a man with sound
Islamic credentials and considerably more theological grounding than
his predecessor Mahathir, was perhaps uniquely placed to seek a new,
more moderate Islamist theological footing for UMNO. The set of
ideas that Badawi is promoting are based on a concept termed Islam
Hadhari or civilisational Islam. It features somewhat vague appeals to
an Islamic vision for development for Malaysia, including in the fields
of  education and economics. It advocates integrity (read clean
government), social progress and social harmony, in which context it
stresses the Islamic ethic of  protection of  minorities. The idea is to
“engage the broader universal principles of Islam”.40 Clearly Islam
Hadhari has echoes of  liberal Islamic thought, albeit perhaps faint ones.
As was the case for PAS, the impetus for UMNO’s Islamic “re-
think” is primarily political, driven by UMNO’s emerging political
dilemma and shaped by UMNO’s political calculations. As Malaysian
politics as a whole steadily moved in a Malay chauvinist and Islamist
political direction, UMNO always moved with it, sufficient to retain
the relatively moderate but thereby commanding position it has always
occupied within the political spectrum. Changes in the political
landscape however make UMNO’s position increasingly difficult. Now
UMNO faces a new challenge as it is squeezed between the continuing
Islamist pressure of  PAS on one side and a resurgent liberal democratic
and secular-tinged opposition on the other. UMNO can no longer afford
to appropriate watered-down PAS Islamist policies, sufficient to stem
–––––––––––––––––
40 Mohammad Hashim Kamali quoted in New Straits Times 8/10/08.
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the flow of  Malay votes to PAS, while remaining confident that it will
retain moderate Malay support and that of  the other communities.
Moderate Malay and Muslim voters now have a viable alternative in
PKR, as do former MIC and MCA voters. Accordingly, UMNO needed
to find a platform from which it could fight effectively on both fronts.
Islam Hadhari has provided UMNO with an ideological weapon
which has shored up its Islamic credentials. PAS has always presented
itself  as the keepers of  the “true Islam” and painted UMNO as un-
Islamic. Its success in this regard has rested to a significant extent on
its claims to Islamic theological authority, an impression reinforced by
its persistent reiteration of  an unbending Islamist ideology. Now
UMNO is better able to compete with PAS on its own theological
ground, armed with an alternative Islamic ideology underpinned by its
own claims to Islamic authority. UMNO has gone to some lengths to
bolster the religious authority of Islam Hadhari. Badawi has offered
Islam Hadhari to the Muslim world, promoting it as the way forward
as an “antidote to the tide of extremism”.41 In this vein the Malaysian
government hosted a World Al-Azhar Alumni conference in February
2008 and secured endorsement for the concept from international
delegates.42 Thus no longer does UMNO’s Islamic position seem so
apologetic and compromised by an “un-Islamic” attachment to
“Western” values. Now UMNO adopts a more assertive stance, insisting
that its moderation is squarely within the authentic and mainstream
tradition of Islam. This stance also supports the charge that UMNO
has always levelled against PAS (with some success post 9-11), that
PAS is extremist. Now this is not merely a political charge, it is also
theological, since by implication if it is UMNO that is squarely within
the authentic Islamic tradition with Islam Hadhari then PAS cannot
be.
Islam Hadhari has also provided a basis for UMNO to seek to
repair its reputation with the non-Muslim communities and with the
disaffected cosmopolitan Malays attracted to the Anwar Ibrahim
–––––––––––––––––
41 Ioannis Gatsiounis, “Islam Hadhari in Malaysia, Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology,  3, 16( February, 2006).
42 “Islam Hadhari Suitable as Foundation of New Islamic Civilisation”, Bernama
Daily Malaysian News, (18 February 2008).
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alternative. The Islam Hadhari concept promised a more inclusive and
pluralistic Islam, clean government, and continuation of  Malaysia’s
drive towards economic development and modernity. The election
results suggest that Islam Hadhari had relatively little appeal to this
constituency. As Anwar Ibrahim and other critics have pointed out,
there appears to be a substantial gap between the government’s Islam
Hadhari rhetoric and the reality of its practice. But perhaps the election
result would have been even worse without Islam Hadhari which
allowed the government to present a less threatening “Islamic face”
while remaining within an Islamic discourse.
While faint, the liberal Islamic notes in Badawi’s Islam Hadhari
concept were certainly too loud for PAS which condemns civilisational
Islam. PAS does so in predictably literalist terms, as bidah (innovation)
and thus blasphemy. PAS President Abdul Hadi Awang’s book, Islamic
Civilisation not Civilisational Islam (Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam
Hadhari) damned it for allowing a compartmentalised Islam alongside
un-Islamic elements, effectively a hybrid, new religion.43 Other Islamist
forces in Malaysia were not much more welcoming. ABIM offered
qualified acceptance of civilisational Islam but regards liberal Islam as
a “stealthy scheme” which seeks “to subvert the primary role of Islam
in Malaysia’s polity”.44
Nevertheless, notwithstanding any intrinsic deficiencies or the
criticisms mounted against Islam Hadhari, the very advancement of
these ideas by the definitively mainstream and politically important
UMNO is a significant development. It remains to be seen whether
the concept will continue to be promoted after Badawi’s prime
ministership, although his likely successor his deputy Najib Tun Razak
has pledged to do so.45 But at the very least the concept is a further
–––––––––––––––––
43 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Islamist Realignments and the Rebranding of
the Muslim Youth Movement in Malaysia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, 2 (2008),
p. 223.
44 Ibid., p, 224 and p. 228.
45 Shahanaaz Habib, “Najib to continue promoting Islam Hadhari”, The Star,
13 November, 2008. Badawi has announced he will step down in March 2009 for Najib
Razak. In the interim Anwar Ibrahim continues to attempt to wrest the prime
ministership through defection of sufficient BN members of parliament to the BA.
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indication of the attempts that range right across the Malaysian Islamic
political spectrum to chart a new course for Malaysia through the
problems associated with the country’s complex and dangerous
horizontal divisions. While it is promising that a start has been made
there is as yet no substantial progress. There is no consensus amongst
Malaysia’s Muslims on the way forward and nothing has been done to
redress the grievances of  the non-Muslim communities.
H. Conclusion
In May 1959, Tunku Abdul Rahman reiterated his assurance that
Malaysia was not an Islamic state. Exasperated he remarked: “Unless
we are prepared to drown every non-Malay, we can never think of  an
Islamic Administration”.46 While of course no serious political force in
Malaysia has ever advocated ethnic cleansing, non-Muslim Malaysians
might regard an Islamic state as their figurative drowning. Partial moves
in this direction, combined with excessive pro-Malay positive
discrimination policies, have brought Malaysia close to disaster. The
majority of the population, including it would seem a majority of
Malaysia’s Muslims recognise this. It appears that Malaysia has stepped
back from the brink and is undertaking a re-evaluation of  the country’s
problems associated with its horizontal divisions.
Abdul Rahman put his finger on the essence of the problem in
his above statement. The reality is that while Malaysia’s non-Muslim
population is a minority it is a very substantial one – 40%. It is simply
not realistic to contemplate implementation of an Islamic state in such
a context, particularly if it is conceived in a classical sense with dhimmi
provisions and the like. Something along those lines could only possibly
function effectively and without massive repression in a situation where
non-Muslims constituted a much smaller minority. Only PAS, and a
small number of much smaller organisations, appear not to fully
appreciate this reality. But even PAS is aware of  the problem and is
–––––––––––––––––
46 Quoted in Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, “Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy
and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia”,
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 13, (2006), from F.R. von der Mehden,
‘Religion and Politics in Malaya’, Asian Survey 3, 12, (1963), pp. 609-615, quoting Straits
Times, (1 May 1959).
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struggling with the issue, seeking ways consistent with its literalist
theological understanding of  Islam to accommodate Malaysia’s plural
population structure.
A Bangsa Malaysia remains quite some way off, if it ever does
eventuate. Although a poll of Malaysian youth in 2004 indicated
majority support for the concept and for removal of political parties
based on ethnicity.47
–––––––––––––––––
47 Ibid., p. 117.
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